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TH E following case, which attained con-siderable publicity, illustrates the point 
of the preceding article. It is stated as 
reported without first-hand knowledge of 
the facts. The case involves an engage-
ment where accountants not only failed 
to apprise the client of a dangerous situa-
tion, but also failed to detect an embezzle-
ment until after it had grown to large 
proportions. 
The comptroller of a large manufacturing 
concern was successful in misappropriating 
more than a million dollars of the com-
pany's money. His operations extended 
over a period of three years before being 
brought to light. The comptroller, in 
addition to the ordinary duties of such an 
official, was authorized to sign all company 
checks. As a result he was able to effect 
embezzlement by fraudulent transfer of 
funds between company banks. 
Several plants were operated by the 
company in various sections of the country, 
some at distant points. Bank accounts, 
considerable in number, were carried at the 
different plants, but were controlled by the 
main office of the company. Transfers of 
funds between banks were made frequently, 
and in large amounts. At times transfers 
were effected by the remittance of checks 
drawn on one bank in favor of another; 
at other times bank drafts were purchased 
at the home office bank and remitted. 
The company's accounting procedure 
provided that when a transfer check was 
issued, it was credited to the bank on 
which drawn, and charged to an account 
called "Funds in Transit." In due course 
the payee bank reported the receipt of the 
check or bank draft, and an entry was made 
to charge that bank and to credit "Funds 
in Transit." In the usual run of business, 
therefore, an individual item did not re-
main very long in the "Funds in Transit" 
account. 
Negligence 
The defaulter obtained his funds in the 
following manner. He drew checks on 
banks with large balances, in favor of the 
home office bank. These checks osten-
sibly were for the purpose of buying drafts 
to be sent for deposit in other banks at out-
side points. The checks were entered 
regularly in the cash book, being charged to 
"Funds in Transit." Instead of actually 
buying the drafts, however, the comptroller 
deposited the checks in the home office 
bank to the credit of another business con-
cern which he owned and operated. 
In cases of such manipulations, there 
were of course no advices received by the 
company from the banks to which the 
diverted funds were supposed to have been 
transferred. The items were allowed to 
remain in the "Funds in Transit" account 
for a number of days, but not over the end 
of a month. 
Near the end of the month the comp-
troller concealed the shortage by "kiting" 
checks. He drew checks on the home office 
bank aggregating the amount of the short-
age, and forwarded them for deposit in the 
banks where the original transfers were 
supposed to have been deposited. The 
checks were not entered in the records until 
the following month. They were mailed 
at such times as to reach the payee banks 
before the close of the month, but not to 
reach the home office bank, on which they 
were drawn, until after the close of the 
month, so that they would not be included 
in the current settlement of the latter. 
At the same time the comptroller put 
through an entry clearing the "Funds in 
Transit" account and charging the banks 
in which deposits of unentered checks had 
been made. The same process was re-
peated at the end of each month. The 
amounts involved gradually increased as 
the shortage became greater. 
At the end of the month, after the un-
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entered checks had been deposited and 
credited by the payee banks, the balances 
shown on the monthly bank statements 
agreed with those shown in the cash book. 
Accountants accepted this agreement as 
final for nearly three years. The shortage 
was eventually discovered by making a 
comparison between the dates of transfer 
checks and the dates of the corresponding 
deposits. The checks used in the manipula-
tion uniformly bore dates from several 
days to a month prior to the dates on which 
they were shown by the banks as being 
deposited, during which time they re-
mained in the "Funds in Transit" account. 
Proper reconcilement of the bank ac-
counts, including a comparison with the 
cash records or check books, of late deposits 
made as shown by the bank statements, 
should have disclosed the shortage at the 
time of the first audit after the commence-
ment of the irregularity. 
This case illustrates the danger of per-
mitting the comptroller of a company to 
sign checks. His duties are to safeguard 
the funds by exercising control over the 
financial activities of the treasurer. The 
functions of comptroller and treasurer 
should not be performed by the same in-
dividual. 
